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Abstract
Strong epistemic anti-individualism—i.e., the claim that knowledge can be irreduc-
ibly social—is increasingly debated within mainstream and social epistemology. 
Most existing approaches attempt to argue for the view on the basis of aggregative 
analyses, which focus on the way certain groups aggregate the epistemic attitudes 
of their members. Such approaches are well motivated, given that many groups to 
which we often ascribe group knowledge—such as juries and committees—oper-
ate in this way. Yet another way that group knowledge can be generated is on the 
basis of epistemic collaborations, such as scientific research teams and Transactive 
Memory Systems. To produce knowledge, epistemic collaborations rely heavily on 
the mutual interactions of their group members. This is a distinctive feature of epis-
temic collaborations that renders them resistant to aggregative analyses. To accom-
modate this kind of group knowledge, the paper combines virtue reliabilism with the 
hypothesis of distributed cognition in order to introduce the hybrid approach of dis-
tributed virtue reliabilism. On this view, (1) beliefs produced by epistemic collabo-
rations entertain positive epistemic standing (i.e., they are both reliable and epistem-
ically responsible) in virtue of the mutual interactions of their group members; (2) 
this positive epistemic standing is a collective property; (3) epistemic collaborations 
qualify as epistemic group agents; (4) collaborative knowledge is a special kind of 
group knowledge, motivating strong epistemic anti-individualism in a distinctive 
way.
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1  Epistemic Collaborations
Knowledge is many times attributed to entire groups such as committees, corpora-
tions, intelligence agencies and scientific research teams. Interpreting such collective 
knowledge ascriptions literally amounts to accepting strong epistemic anti-individu-
alism—the increasingly debated claim that knowledge, under the right conditions, 
can be irreducibly social.1
Several epistemologists attempt to motivate this view by focusing on the way cer-
tain groups (such as juries and committees) aggregate the epistemic attitudes of their 
members in order to form an epistemic attitude on the part of the collective. For 
example, Tuomela (2004), Gilbert (1994, 2007a, b, 2010) and Rolin (2008) focus 
on cases where group members jointly believe or accept individually derived justi-
fied true propositions as the representative view of their group. In a similar fash-
ion, Goldman’s ‘social process reliabilism’ (2014) is cashed out in terms of reliable 
processes for aggregating the justificatory statuses of group members’ true beliefs 
and List and Pettit (List 2005; List and Pettit 2011) focus on processes for aggregat-
ing individual judgments so as to track certain truths.2 Arguing for the existence of 
group knowledge by focusing on processes for aggregating the epistemic attitudes 
of group members is, indeed, well-motivated, given that many groups to which we 
often ascribe group knowledge—such as juries and committees—operate in this 
way.
Yet another way that group knowledge may be generated is on the basis of epis-
temic collaborations, such as the ones taking place between the members of scien-
tific research teams, intelligence agencies and medical teams. This appears to be a 
special kind of group knowledge that is not amenable to aggregative analyses. The 
reason is that the final product of epistemic collaborations—i.e., true beliefs with 
positive epistemic standing—is not generated by adding together the individually 
derived epistemic attitudes of their members. Instead, in epistemic collaborations, 
knowledge is produced on the basis of the participants’  collaborative interactions. 
Focusing on procedures for merely aggregating the epistemic attitudes of isolated 
individuals cannot therefore capture the process by which epistemic collaborations 
operate.3 To account for this special kind of group knowledge, mainstream and 
social epistemology need an alternative, non-aggregative approach.
In the following sections, the paper offers such an account that consists in the 
combination of virtue reliabilism with the hypothesis of distributed cognition. The 
1 See, for example, Hardwig (1985), Tollefsen (2006, 2015), Bird (2010, 2014), List (2005), Lackey 
(2014a, 4b, 2016), Goldman (1999, 2004), (de Ridder 2014) and (Wray 2007).
2 List (2005) and List and Pettit (2011) follow Nozick’s (1981) ‘truth tracking’ approach to knowledge.
3 Goldman (2014) notes that, sometimes, the members of the groups he is interested in may arrive at 
their individual epistemic attitudes—which will then be aggregated—on the basis of interacting with 
each other. As he repeatedly notes in his essay, however, his approach to group knowledge focuses exclu-
sively on the process of aggregating the epistemic attitudes of individuals (however these are derived). 
As it stands, therefore, Goldman’s account does not aim to explain (aspects of) collective knowledge that 
is collaboratively produced. Its focus is specifically on group knowledge that is aggregatively produced.
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motivation for this hybrid approach is threefold and it centers around the distinctive 
feature of epistemic collaborations—i.e., their members’ collaborative interactions. 
First, according to the hypothesis of distributed cognition, appropriately interact-
ing individuals can give rise to distributed cognitive systems that manifest collec-
tive properties. Such properties may be collective skills such as sport-team strategies 
(Cooke et al. 2013; Duarte et al. 2012, 2013a, b), collective foraging (Theiner et al. 
2010) and collective memory (Wegner et  al. 1985). The paper argues that, in the 
case of epistemic collaborations, the collective cognitive property is the resulting 
beliefs’ positive epistemic standing. To make sense of this claim from an epistemo-
logical perspective leads to the second reason for employing the suggested hybrid 
approach. Ideally—from the point of view of mainstream epistemology—a group’s 
positive epistemic standing should be modeled after an account of the positive epis-
temic standing of individuals. The claim here is that the positive epistemic standing 
of epistemic collaborations results from their members’  collaborative interactions. 
Consequently, we need to draw on an account of individual knowledge, according 
to which the positive epistemic standing of an individual agent’s beliefs arises out 
of collaborative interactions between different parts of their cognitive system. Virtue 
reliabilism puts forward precisely such an account. Accordingly, the third and final 
reason for this hybrid approach is that virtue reliabilism can be read along the lines 
suggested by the hypothesis of distributed cognition. On such a reading, it will be 
argued, epistemic collaborations collectively manifest—on the basis of their mem-
bers’ interactions—the property of positive epistemic standing. Since this is a col-
lective property, knowledge produced by epistemic collaborations can be used to 
motivate strong epistemic anti-individualism.
The paper proceeds in the following stages. To illustrate the special character of 
collaborative knowledge, Sect. 2 turns to the fields of cognitive psychology and phi-
losophy of science to present two examples of epistemic collaborations: (1) Transac-
tive Memory Systems and (2) scientific research teams. Both examples demonstrate 
that, within each field, collaborative knowledge is taken to be irreducibly social, 
because it arises out of the members’ mutual interactions. Section 3 introduces the 
hypothesis of distributed cognition (Sect. 3.1) and virtue reliabilism (Sect. 3.2), and 
then combines the two theories to explain how epistemic collaborations collectively 
manifest the property of positive epistemic standing (Sect. 3.3). Finally, to clarify 
the account on offer, Sect. 4 contrasts it with the alternative of distributed reliabi-
lism (Michaelian and Arango-Muñoz 2018). By way of juxtaposing the two views, it 
will also become clear how the notion of collective epistemic standing can motivate 
the existence of epistemic group agents. As it will become apparent, motivating the 
existence of such epistemic group entities is necessary, if we are to avoid the claim 
that collaborative knowledge is knowledge without a knowing subject (Giere 2007; 
Popper 1968).
Before starting, it is worth clarifying a point regarding the paper’s dialectics. 
Knowledge is largely thought to be a composite notion, whose main two components 
are (1) belief and (2) its associated positive epistemic standing (usually referred to as 
justification or warrant). Many of the existing attempts to motivate strong epistemic 
anti-individualism focus on the belief component—i.e., they attempt to argue that 
instances of knowledge are irreducibly social, because the relevant propositions are, 
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in some appropriate sense, collectively believed or accepted.4 While such approaches 
to collective knowledge merit serious consideration, it is not clear whether they are 
successful in showing that the group’s beliefs (and thus the pieces of knowledge they 
form part of) are, indeed, irreducibly social.5 Whatever the outcome of this debate 
may be, the present account does not hinge on it. This is because, as noted above, the 
approach on offer argues for the irreducibly social nature of collaborative knowledge 
by focusing, instead, on the component of positive epistemic standing. That is, col-
laborative knowledge, it will be argued, can motivate strong epistemic anti-individu-
alism, not because the relevant propositions are collectively believed, but because of 
the collective nature of the belief-generating process that confers positive epistemic 
standing to them. Of course, if the resulting propositions turn, on some appropriate 
construal, to also be held by the group in an irreducibly social manner, that would be 
a welcome result. But if the following account is correct, arguing for this additional 
claim is not necessary for demonstrating that collaborative knowledge can motivate 
the truth of strong epistemic anti-individualism.
2  Examples of Collaborative Knowledge
To get a grip on the phenomenon of collaborative knowledge, it is useful to consider 
two examples that are available in the literature. The first one concerns Transactive 
Memory Systems and it comes from the field of cognitive psychology. The second 
example is the case of scientific research teams and it comes from the field of phi-
losophy of science. In both cases, collaborative knowledge is considered to be irre-
ducibly social, because it arises out of members’ collaborative interactions.
2.1  Transactive Memory Systems
Memory is often cited as a justificatory process on the basis of which individuals 
know propositions that they have encountered in the past. While memory is stand-
ardly associated with individual knowers, recent studies within cognitive psychol-
ogy suggest that memory can be instantiated by groups of two or more individuals. 
Known as Transactive Memory Systems (TMS), such groups can be used in order 
“to conceptualize how people in close relationships may depend on each other for 
acquiring, remembering, and generating knowledge” (Wegner et al. 1985, p. 253).
“To build a transactive memory is to acquire a set of communication processes 
whereby two minds can work as one” (Wegner et al. 1985, 263). This involves skill-
ful, interactive, and simultaneous coordination between people (Bernier et al. 2008). 
Collaboration allows the group to reliably recall pieces of information in a manner 
that would be unavailable to its members were they to recollect on their own. Con-
sider the following example:
4 See, for example, Gilbert (2007a, b, 2010), and Tuomela (2004).
5 For an overview of the existing debate, see Tollefsen (2004).
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Suppose we are spending an evening with Rudy and Lulu, a couple married 
for several years. Lulu is in another room for the moment, and we happen to 
ask Rudy where they got that wonderful staffed Canadian goose on the mantle. 
He says “we were in British Columbia…,” and then bellows, “Lulu! What was 
the name of that place where we got the goose?” Lulu returns to the room to 
say that it was near Kelowna or Penticton—somewhere along lake Okanogan. 
Rudy says, “Yes, in that area with all the fruit stands.” Lulu finally makes the 
identification: Peachland (Wegner et al. 1985, p. 257)
Wegner et  al. explain that, during the discussion between Rudy and Lulu, the 
various ideas they exchange lead them through and elicit their individual memories. 
“In a process of interactive cueing, they move sequentially toward the retrieval of a 
memory trace, the existence of which is known to both of them. And it is possible 
that without each other, neither Rudy nor Lulu could have produced the item” (1985, 
p. 257).
Moreover, transactive processes do not only take place during the retrieval of 
memories. They may also occur during the processes of encoding as well as storage 
(Wegner et al. 1985). When partners discuss about an event as they are experienc-
ing it, their discussion, far from being a mere rehash of the original event, can lead 
them to encode memories that are qualitatively different from the memories that 
they would have acquired, had they been on their own. Similarly, if the dyad engages 
in transactive processes after the event has taken place, it may qualitatively alter the 
members’ initial, private memories of the event, thereby also having an effect on the 
process of storage.
Accordingly, Wegner et al. claim, “the observable interaction between individu-
als entails not only the transfer of knowledge, but the construction of a knowledge-
acquiring, knowledge-holding and knowledge-using system that is greater than the 
sum of its individual member systems” (1985, p. 256).
2.2  Scientific Research Teams
In a series of papers, Giere (Giere 2002a, b, 2006, 2007; Giere and Moffat 2003) has 
proposed that collaborative experiments give rise to knowledge that is irreducibly 
social.
To motivate this claim, Giere places emphasis on the scientists’ coordinated inter-
actions in generating scientific knowledge. In much of scientific experimentation, 
“completing the task requires coordinated action by several different people” (2006, 
p. 711). This coordinated action “makes possible the acquisition of knowledge that 
no single person, or a group of people without instruments, could possibly acquire” 
(2003, p. 305). Thus, to “understand the workings of the big cognitive system one 
has to consider the human–machine interactions as well as the human–human inter-
actions” (Giere 2002b, p. 292). The examples that Giere proposes are High Energy 
Physics (HEP) experiments (2002a), the Hubble Space Telescope (2006), and 
Latour’s (1999) (Giere and Mofat 2003) example of a scientific investigation that 
seeks to determine whether the Amazonian rainforest is encroaching on the adjacent 
savannah or whether the savannah is encroaching on the rainforest.
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Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) ethnographic study of HEP experiments puts forward simi-
lar remarks. She notes that large collaborations are not run by any individual alone 
and no individual is responsible for their management and organization. Such exper-
iments are managed, instead, by discourse. Discourse “channels individual knowl-
edge in the experiment, providing it with a sort of distributed cognition […], which 
flows from the astonishingly intricate webs of communication pathways” (ibid. 173). 
These ongoing interactions between participants form a grid of discourse spaces, 
which “was and is today perhaps the most important vehicle of experimental coor-
dination and integration” (ibid. 174). Knorr-Cetina lists, among others, research and 
development meetings, panel meetings, institute meetings, steering group meetings, 
collaboration meetings, referee meetings, accelerator meetings, fixed committee 
meetings, special workshops dedicated to detector complexes, ‘submeetings of some 
of the former, and the very important “meetings after the  meeting” (the informal 
exchanges that occur after scheduled events)’ (ibid., 174).
It is evident that, just like TMSs so in the case of collaborative science, the partic-
ipants’ ongoing mutual interactions play a central role in coordinating the activities 
that make up the overall process of scientific experimentation. The above authors 
take this as evidence that the resulting knowledge is not the product of any individ-
ual alone or the aggregate of the knowledge possessed by the individual scientists. 
Instead, knowledge acquired on the basis of collaborative experiments is the product 
of a collective socio-technical process that arises out of the scientists’ coordinated 
interactions.
3  Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism
The previous examples indicate that referring to collaborative knowledge as the 
knowledge possessed by a group of people as a whole is a bona fide phenomenon 
advocated within academic disciplines such as philosophy of science and cognitive 
psychology. They also demonstrate that the reason why collaborative knowledge is 
taken to be irreducibly social is that it arises out of the group members’ collabora-
tive interactions.
To understand collaborative knowledge from the point of view of mainstream 
epistemology, the following sections build an account of the phenomenon by focus-
ing on the distinctive feature of epistemic collaborations—i.e., the group members’ 
collaborative interactions. Arriving at such an account requires a hybrid approach 
that consists of the combination of virtue reliabilism with the hypothesis of distrib-
uted cognition. Section 3.1 lays out the main contours of the hypothesis of distrib-
uted cognition and Sect. 3.2 focuses on virtue reliabilism. Section 3.3 synthesises 
the two theories in a hybrid view in order to accommodate collaborative knowledge.
3.1  Distributed Cognition
Previously, we saw that Giere (2002b) has proposed to understand scientific 
experiments in terms of distributed cognition. Likewise, TMSs are exemplars of 
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distributed cognition within philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Sutton 
2008; Sutton et al. 2010; Theiner 2013b).
According to the hypothesis of distributed cognition,6 when the members of a 
group collaboratively interact with each other, they give rise to novel, cognitive 
properties, over and above the sum of the properties possessed by its individual 
members. These are supposed to be the collective properties of a distributed cogni-
tive system that consists of all the participating individuals. So, what is a distributed 
cognitive system and in what sense are its properties collective?
Within the literature, there are several ways to motivate the existence of distrib-
uted cognitive systems with collective properties.7 However, for the present pur-
poses, I shall restrict the focus on what is perhaps the most succinct and informative 
approach on offer—one that relies on the mathematical field of Dynamical Systems 
Theory (DST).8 Though mathematically informed, the approach is fairly simple. It 
starts with DST’s formal understanding of what a property is and it ends with capi-
talizing on DST’s notion of a coupled system.
According to DST, properties are (actual or counterfactual) regularities in the 
behavior of a system as a whole.9 When a system functions in isolation, or it merely 
receives the effects of other systems, it is disposed to manifest a specific range of 
regular behaviors, as these are dictated by the system’s background conditions and 
the equation governing its operation. These regularities of behavior are the system’s 
properties. As it happens, however, when two (or more) systems engage in continu-
ous, reciprocal interactions with each other—such that the effects of each system are 
continuously fed back to itself—novel properties arise. The reason these properties 
are supposed to be novel is because they refer to regularities of behavior that the 
contributing systems won’t manifest either in isolation or aggregatively (i.e., when 
they are combined or added together, but in such a way that they do not continuously 
and reciprocally interact with each other).10 Properties, however, are always proper-
ties of a given system. Thus, to avoid leaving these regularities of behavior unac-
counted for, it is necessary to postulate a corresponding coupled (i.e., distributed) 
system comprising of all the interacting (sub)systems.
6 See for example (Heylighen et al. 2004; Hutchins 1995; Sutton et al. 2010; Sutton 2008; Theiner et al. 
2010; Theiner 2013a, b; Tollefsen and Dale 2012).
7 For an overview of the available argumentative approaches to the hypothesis of distributed cognition, 
see Theiner (2017).
8 DST is the branch of theoretical mathematics that deals with the study of complex systems that change 
over time—i.e., dynamical systems. It is widely used within nearly every scientific discipline (including 
physics, chemistry, biology and cognitive science) to model the behaviour of dynamical systems.
9 The qualification ‘counterfactual’ is necessary for accommodating the fact that no behaviour is going 
to be regular in the absence of the appropriate background and initial conditions. Only if the right condi-
tions occur regularly, will the relevant properties also manifest regularly.
10 Aggregative properties are reducible to the sum of the properties of the contributing systems. Con-
sider, for example, the property of the weight of a group. A group of five people will regularly weigh 
more than one person. However, this regularity of behaviour fails to qualify as a collective property, 




According to DST, then, when and only when systems engage in continuous 
reciprocal interactions with each other, do they give rise to an integrated, distrib-
uted system.11 In practice, this means that when individuals interact loosely and in a 
largely unidirectional way—such as in cases of receiving testimony from a stranger 
or in the court of law—they do not, by the lights of DST, give rise to a distributed 
cognitive system. In such cases, while there may be a minimal amount of interper-
sonal communication involved, the speaker’s informational output is not the prod-
uct of sustained reciprocal interactions with the hearer. On the contrary, in TMSs 
and collaborative scientific research teams, the completion of the relevant cognitive 
task involves ongoing reciprocal interactions between the participating individuals. 
Therefore, according to DST, in such cases we can talk of an overall distributed cog-
nitive system that consists of all the participating individuals. The DST approach to 
distributed cognition thus provides a clear way for distinguishing between distrib-
uted cognition and cognition that is merely socially embedded. The difference is that 
only in the case of distributed cognition, does there exist an integrated system that 
arises out of the members’ continuous and reciprocal interactions.
By relying, in this way, on DST to draw a sharp distinction between groups of 
people that form genuine distributed cognitive systems and cases where two or more 
people engage in mere social interactions is a considerable advantage of the pre-
sent approach to collaborative knowledge. If any group of individuals who socially 
interacted with each other were to count as a distributed cognitive system, then it 
would seem that there is something fundamentally wrong with the idea of collabo-
rative knowledge as a special kind of group knowledge. Indeed, standard cases of 
testimonial knowledge would run the risk of qualifying as such. Of course, this is 
intuitively incorrect, and through its reliance on DST, the present account has the 
resources to explain why. As noted above, acquiring knowledge via testimony may 
involve some social interaction—perhaps the hearer asks a question and, depending 
on the answer they receive, they may also ask for some clarification. But the piece 
of information that constitutes the knowledge transmitted from the speaker to the 
hearer is not produced on the basis of continuous reciprocal interactions between 
the two.12 Thus standard cases of testimonial exchange fail, by the lights of DST, to 
12 If the resulting piece of knowledge were the product of ongoing reciprocal interactions between indi-
viduals, as in cases of brainstorming, or, better, Transactive Memory Systems, then it would be a can-
didate for collaborative group knowledge. But I take it that when it comes to brainstorming one is more 
inclined to allow for this possibility, and as noted in Sect. 2.1, cognitive scientists already think of TMSs 
as “knowledge-acquiring, knowledge-holding and knowledge-using [systems] that [are] greater than the 
sum of [their] individual member systems” (Wegner et al. 1985, p. 256). Indeed, as an anonymous ref-
eree also notes, many long-term intimate relationships and close friendships would be plausible candi-
dates for qualifying as TMSs capable to give rise to collaborative knowledge. So, although testimonial 
exchanges do not give rise to collaborative knowledge, epistemic collaborations in the form of TMSs and 
the collaborative knowledge they produce may be more common than what one may initially assume.
11 For a detailed explanation of why the existence of reciprocal interactions between agents and their 
artifacts ensures the existence of distributed cognitive systems, see (Palermos 2016a). To pre-empt a pos-
sible worry, the relevant reciprocal interactions need only be continuous during the operation of the dis-
tributed cognitive system and the unfolding of any processes related to it. For example, if, as part of her 
job and during normal working hours, individual S participates in distributed cognitive system X, S does 
not need to continuously interact with the other members of X, when she is at home. However, whenever 
X is in operation, S must continuously and reciprocally interact with the rest of the X-members.
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give rise to distributed cognitive systems and so, in agreement with intuition, would 
not, on the present approach, be candidates for giving rise to collaborative group 
knowledge either.13
Additionally, DST can help us clarify the sense in which certain properties are 
collective properties. First, we must not forget that, according to DST, properties 
are (actual or counterfactual) regularities in the behavior of a system as a whole. 
Though highly unlikely, this means that a token instance of a behavior—which were 
to be performed regularly would qualify as a distributed system’s property—can, in 
principle, be irregularly performed by a random collection of individuals that falls 
short of forming an integrated group.14 According to DST, however, such irregular 
behavior won’t count as the manifestation of a system’s property. Consider the fol-
lowing example, with respect to the behavior involved in performing a collaborative 
scientific experiment.
When they work on their own, individual scientists are free to undertake a num-
ber of activities including interacting with equipment, performing calculations, tak-
ing breaks, writing papers, supervising students, refereeing articles and so on. Now, 
imagine that, one day, a few isolated scientists who work on their individual projects 
happen to perform a sequence of actions. Surprisingly, this sequence of actions is 
identical to a process that would routinely take place during a collaborative scientific 
experiment. Yet, intuitively, these scientists’ activity does not qualify as performing 
a collaborative scientific experiment. The reason is that their actions, though identi-
cal to those of an experiment, are highly unlikely to occur in a consistent manner. 
On the contrary, actual experiments consist of sustained behaviors that are (or at 
least can be) regularly repeated. Accordingly, it would be incorrect to claim that the 
above scientists’ one-off behavior can qualify as performing a collaborative scien-
tific experiment.
The crucial question to ask, then, is what would it be required of those scientists 
to turn their fleeting behavior into regular behavior? The answer is a rather obvious 
one. To routinely perform the required sequence of actions, these scientists need to 
coordinate; which, in turn, requires that they engage in continuous reciprocal inter-
actions with each other. Put another way, the behavioral regularities that constitute 
scientific experiments can only manifest in the presence of collaborative activity 
between the participants.
With that in mind, we can now see the sense in which certain properties are col-
lective. As the example demonstrates, the regular behavior that underlies a scientific 
experiment cannot be manifested by any of the participating scientists alone. And 
neither can it be achieved by their mere aggregate—such an aggregate would at best 
13 Indeed, elsewhere  (Palermos 2016b), I have argued that testimonial knowledge can only motivate 
weak epistemic anti-individualism—i.e., the significantly weaker claim that, occasionally, knowledge can 
be both social and individual at the same time.
14 In connection with footnote 9, ‘irregularly’ should be here understood as ‘irregularly even if the 
appropriate background and initial conditions are regularly in place.’
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manifest the relevant behavior only fleetingly. Accordingly, performing the experi-
ment is a property that cannot be attributed to either the underlying individuals or 
their sum. As the regularity of behavior that it is, however, it must still be accounted 
for as the property of some system. So, what might this system be? Given that only 
the scientists’ collaborative interactions can support the relevant regularity of behav-
ior, this is, by the lights of DST, the property of the entire distributed cognitive sys-
tem, consisting of all the collaborating participants. In other words, such regularities 
of behavior that arise out of group members’ continuous and reciprocal interactions 
are collective (as opposed to individual or aggregative) properties, because they can 
only be attributed to a corresponding group entity.
3.2  Virtue Reliabilism
It is widely accepted that in order to know, one must have a true belief with posi-
tive epistemic standing. Moreover, broadly speaking, epistemologists assume that 
positive epistemic standing consists in the agent’s true belief being (1) produced by 
a process that is de facto reliable and/or (2) formed in a way that is epistemically 
responsible.
Traditionally, the second condition of epistemic responsibility has been 
approached in terms of justification, where justification is understood as the abil-
ity to provide positive explicit reasons in support of one’s beliefs or in support of 
the reliability of one’s beliefs, by reflection alone.15 While this is an intuitive way 
to think about epistemic responsibility, a significant worry concerns several belief-
forming processes, such as our perceptual faculties and memory. Such belief-form-
ing processes are generally held to be knowledge-conducive, but most epistemic 
agents do not know how they work or why they are reliable. Accordingly, when we 
acquire knowledge on their basis, it seems incorrect to require that we be in a posi-
tion to offer, by reflection alone, explicit positive reasons in their support.16
To solve this problem, process reliabilists have suggested that we stop thinking 
about epistemic responsibility in terms of justification, and perhaps abandon the 
requirement of epistemically responsible true beliefs altogether.17 Instead, positive 
epistemic standing consists only in arriving at true beliefs on the basis of processes 
that are de facto reliable. According to process reliabilism, to know, one only needs 
to form a true belief on the basis of a belief-forming process that is in fact reliable—
no matter whether one is aware that this is the case. This is widely accepted to be a 
promising strategy for sidestepping the above problem for epistemic responsibility 
when it is understood in terms of justification. Nevertheless, it invites a host of prob-
lems of its own.
15 This is known as the access internalist approach to justification. For classic defenses of the view see 
(BonJour 1985; Chisholm 1977; Steup 1999).
16 For more on this problem for access-internalism, see Greco’s (1999) discussion, which draws on 
Hume’s problem of induction.
17 The locus classicus of process reliabilism is (Goldman 1979). For an overview see (Goldman & Bed-
dor 2016).
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First, process reliabilism does not guarantee the right direction of fit between 
truth and belief. One may reliably form true beliefs on the basis of a process, not 
because the relevant process gets the world correct. Instead, there might be some 
secret scheme in play (say a benevolent demon) that manipulates the world so as 
to correspond to the agent’s randomly formed beliefs, as soon as they are formed.18 
Secondly, process reliabilism fails to rule correct in cases where true beliefs are gen-
erated on the basis of reliable, but fleeting (or strange) processes. Intuitively, despite 
being reliable, unstable and abnormal processes should not count as knowledge-
conducive.19 Finally, by focusing solely on de facto reliability, process reliabilism 
misses an important dimension of our epistemic nature. While it is true that in order 
to know we need the way of forming our beliefs to be in fact reliable, intuitively, this 
is not sufficient on its own. What we further need is that we be epistemically respon-
sible in the way we form our beliefs by somehow being sensitive to the reliability of 
our evidence. While process reliabilists are correct to point out, for the reasons men-
tioned above, that this cannot always be achieved on the basis of justification (i.e., 
by having reflective access to positive explicit reasons in support of our beliefs), it 
seems incorrect to ignore this dimension of our epistemic nature altogether.
To solve these problems for process reliabilism, virtue reliabilists have proposed 
to supplement process reliabilism with the ability intuition on knowledge.20 Accord-
ing to this intuition, in order for one’s true beliefs to qualify as knowledge, they must 
be the product of a belief-forming process that counts as a cognitive ability. This 
is an appealing move for three reasons. First, if the relevant process is a cognitive 
ability, the direction of fit between truth and belief is guaranteed to be the correct 
one. Secondly, cognitive abilities are stable intellectual dispositions that are neither 
strange nor fleeting. Finally, cognitive abilities seem to be, at least intuitively, the 
sort of reliable processes that can generate beliefs in an epistemically responsible 
manner, even if one has no explicit positive reasons to offer in their support. For 
example, no one needs to explain why their vision or hearing is reliable when they 
come to acquire knowledge on their basis.
Nevertheless, if this is the way to approach knowledge and epistemic responsibil-
ity, two central questions present themselves: (1) When does a process count as a 
cognitive ability (and thereby as knowledge-conducive); and (2) in what sense can 
one generate epistemically responsible beliefs on the basis of their cognitive abili-
ties, without being in a position to offer explicit reasons in their support? In answer-
ing these two important questions, virtue reliabilists turn to the concept of cognitive 
integration.
20 The idea that knowledge must be grounded in cognitive abilities can be traced back to the writings of 
(Sosa 1988, 1993) and Plantinga (1993). For more recent approaches to this intuition, see Greco (1999, 
2004, 2007) and Pritchard (2009, 2010a, b, 2012).
18 For such a case see Pritchard’s (2009) Truetemp.
19 For an example of a fleeting but reliable process that should fail to count as knowledge-conducive, 
see Greco’s (2010) Careless Math Student. For examples of strange but reliable processes that should 




According to Greco, in order for a reliable process to count as a cognitive abil-
ity (and thereby as knowledge-conducive) it must have been cognitively integrated, 
where “cognitive integration is a function of cooperation and interaction, or coop-
erative interaction with other aspects of the cognitive system” (2010, p. 152). The 
answer to the first question, then, is that a belief-forming process counts as a cog-
nitive ability if and only if it is cognitively integrated on the basis of processes of 
mutual interactions with other aspects of the cognitive system.21
Answering the first question in this way provides the means to respond to the sec-
ond question too; conceiving of cognitive abilities in terms of cognitive integration 
can explain how one is epistemically responsible in forming beliefs on their basis, 
without being able to offer reasons in their support (Palermos 2014). If an agent’s 
belief-forming process cooperatively interacts with other aspects of their cognitive 
system, then it can be continuously monitored, in the background, by their cognitive 
system, such that if there is something wrong with it, then the agent will be able to 
notice this and respond appropriately. Otherwise, if the agent’s background monitor-
ing generates no negative beliefs against their belief-forming process, they can be 
epistemically responsible in employing the relevant process and accepting its results 
by default—even if they have no reasons to offer in their support.
On virtue reliabilism, then, provided that one’s belief-forming process is cogni-
tively integrated by cooperatively interacting with other aspects of their cognitive 
system, they can be epistemically responsible in holding the resulting beliefs merely 
by lacking any negative reasons against them. If this cognitively integrated belief-
forming process is also de facto reliable, then the agent can entertain beliefs with 
full positive epistemic standing.
3.3  Virtue Reliabilism and Distributed Cognition
With the preceding points in place, we can now attempt a hybrid account of col-
laborative knowledge that consists in the combination of virtue reliablism with the 
hypothesis of distributed cognition. The cornerstone of this hybrid approach is the 
concept of cognitive integration. Even though independently developed within dis-
tinct philosophical disciplines, both theories ascribe central role to cognitive inte-
gration, which they both understand in terms of continuous reciprocal interactions 
between different parts of the cognitive system. Just as proponents of distributed 
cognition claim that a group of people is cognitively integrated when its individual 
members engage in reciprocal interactions, so virtue reliabilism claims that cogni-
tive integration of a belief-forming process is a matter of cooperative interactions 
with other parts of the cognitive system. Moreover, virtue reliabilism holds that a 
21 Empirically, this is not an implausible demand. Scientific observations of the human and of many pri-
mates’ brain indicate that brain areas hardly ever operate in isolation. Instead, several parts of the brain 
always work in parallel. Take the case of reaching for and grasping a mug sitting on the desk before you. 
Even this simple cognitive task requires the delicate use of visually received information by functionally 
and neuro-anatomically distinct subsystems operating together. Similarly, it is widely accepted that there 
is constant, bidirectional relationship between our basic perceptual processes, memory systems and other 
inference mechanisms.
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cognitively integrated process qualifies as a cognitive ability that is suitable for gen-
erating knowledge. This suggests that a knowledge-conducive cognitive ability can 
be distributed across an integrated group of collaborating individuals.
Nevertheless, to adequately motivate this claim, we need to understand how the 
integrated nature of epistemic collaborations contributes to their positive epistemic 
standing; in what way is their cognitively integrated nature involved in the produc-
tion of reliable and epistemically responsible beliefs? To answer, we need to unpack 
the way the members’ interactions give rise to two epistemic group properties: The 
group’s (1) epistemic self-organization and (2) epistemic self-regulation.
Self-organization is a diachronic process, during which members of the collabo-
rative group mutually interact until they evolve into a stable configuration. Normally, 
when the group has achieved this stable configuration, it means that its component 
parts have mutually adapted by restricting their interactions to those that allow them 
to regularly accomplish their end.22 In the case of epistemic collaborations, self-
organisation contributes, over time, to the reliability of the collective belief-forming 
process: If the dynamics of the group do not produce a preponderance of true over 
false beliefs, the collective does not regularly accomplish its end; in result, it keeps 
reconfiguring into different structures until it stabilizes into a successful (i.e., suf-
ficiently reliable) one. Alternatively, if this is not possible, eventually, the collective 
will (most likely) dissolve.23 So, overall, by mutually interacting, group members 
participate in a process of self-organisation, which is conducive to shaping a group 
structure that can reliably produce true beliefs. It is this self-organized structure that 
Knorr-Cetina draws attention to when she notes that HEP experiments are not man-
aged and organized by any individual alone. Instead, within HEP experiments, the 
participants’ interactions create a grid of discourse spaces, which “was and is today 
perhaps the most important vehicle of experimental coordination and integration” 
(1999, p. 174).
Mutual interactions between individual members also explains how collaborative 
groups self-regulate synchronically, at the time of performance, to produce epis-
temically responsible true beliefs. The continuous interactivity between the mem-
bers of the group allows them to keep monitoring each other’s performance, such 
that if there is something wrong with the overall process, then the problem will be 
spotted by at least one member of the group, allowing the group to respond appro-
priately. For example, if the members of a TMS are sufficiently coordinated, they 
will be able to notice whether there is a problem with their exchange. For instance, 
22 For more on this process of self-organisation, see (Heylighen et al. 2004).
23 In cases where the group cannot reconfigure into a sufficiently reliable stable structure, it will most 
likely, but not necessarily dissolve for the following reason. It is possible to imagine that an epistemic 
collaboration would persist (i.e., manage to preserve itself) despite continuous failures. For example, 
though rather implausibly, there could be a group of people that have the financial capacity and drive to 
keep their epistemic collaboration going, despite consistently failing to deliver a preponderance of true 
over false beliefs. Therefore, the mere existence of a self-organising epistemic collaboration does not 
guarantee that, eventually, either it will dissolve or it will become reliable (or reliable enough for epis-
temic purposes)—though, in most cases, these are the most likely outcomes. Be that as it may, the claim 
is that if an epistemic collaboration establishes a stable structure that is reliable enough to deliver knowl-
edge, this is going to be (at least to a significant extent) due to its capacity to self-organise.
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they may notice that their partner’s non-verbal or para-verbal cues suggest that they 
misremember. Similarly, in a scientific experiment, if the experimentalist sends in 
data with weak peaks, the mathematician will notice this and will call the physi-
cist’s attention to it. Such synchronic monitoring processes are essentially driven by 
the individuals’ coordinated activity. If on their basis, no member expresses nega-
tive reasons against the overall process, as it unfolds over time, the group can count 
as epistemically responsible for its performance by default—even if no one in the 
group, or even the group as a whole, fully understands how its performance works.
Overall then, the ongoing interactions between the members of epistemic col-
laborations contribute to their positive epistemic standing in both a diachronic and a 
synchronic manner. During the development of the group, the ongoing mutual inter-
actions of the members allows them to self-organize. This process of self-organisa-
tion contributes to shaping the overall system into a structure that can reliably bring 
about true beliefs. Then, on the basis of this self-organized structure, the members 
of the group efficiently interact with each other, providing the group with the ability 
to self-regulate during the actual time of performance.24 The upshot is that the epis-
temic collaboration’s overall ability to generate beliefs with full positive epistemic 
standing is not the product of merely adding together the cognitive abilities of the 
members of the group. Instead, it arises out of their synergetic cooperation. Accord-
ing to DST, this means that the epistemic collaboration’s positive epistemic standing 
is a collective property that belongs to the group as a whole.
An interesting consequence follows from this. We have here reached the conclu-
sion that, in the case of epistemic collaborations, positive epistemic standing is the 
collective property of a group of individuals, constituting an integrated distributed 
cognitive system; since the collective property under consideration is the property 
of positive epistemic standing, the corresponding distributed cognitive system may 
qualify as an epistemic group agent. The following section elaborates on this point.
4  Distributed Virtue Reliabilism
To sum up, in cases of epistemic collaborations, agents continuously and recipro-
cally interact with each other. The result is a group that epistemically self-organ-
izes and self-regulates so as to form a belief-forming process that can reliably and 
responsibly generate true beliefs—i.e., beliefs with positive epistemic standing. DST 
points out that this positive epistemic standing is a collective property, because it 
cannot be accounted for without appealing to an overall distributed cognitive sys-
tem, consisting of all the collaborating individuals. At the end of last section, it was 
noted that, since the epistemic collaboration’s collective property is the property of 
24 It must be noted, however, that the distinction between diachronic reliability and synchronic responsi-
bility, as well as the corresponding distinction between the underlying mechanisms of self-organization 
and self-regulation, are largely theoretical artifacts. In practice, every instance of epistemic self-regula-
tion contributes to the process of epistemic self-organization and vice versa: The diachronic structure of 
the group is continuously shaped by and at the same time shapes its ongoing performance.
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positive epistemic standing, there are good reasons for thinking that the underlying 
distributed system qualifies as an epistemic group agent.
To unpack this point further, it is helpful to contrast the present view with an 
alternative account of collaborative knowledge. Drawing on process reliabilism, 
rather than virtue reliabilism, Michaelian and Arango-Muñoz (2018) have put for-
ward distributed process reliabilism in order to account for knowledge that is spe-
cifically produced by TMSs.
The common ground between the present approach and distributed process relia-
bilism is that they both hold that reliable belief-forming processes can be distrib-
uted between several agents and their artifacts. The main point of departure is that 
the two theories are motivated on the basis of different approaches to knowledge. 
Even though Michaelian and Arango-Muñoz concede that rejecting virtue reliabi-
lism and the associated ability intuition on knowledge is a theoretical sacrifice, they 
opt to develop their approach in terms of process reliabilism. Their methodological 
choice is due to the fact that virtue reliabilism requires a rich notion of group agency 
that entails epistemic responsibility. This is problematic, according to Michaelian 
and Arango-Muñoz, because they doubt that collaborative groups such as TMSs are 
likely to manifest epistemic responsibility. To the contrary, process reliabilism does 
not require that the agent be epistemically responsible, but only de facto reliable in 
the way they form their beliefs. Accordingly, they hold, contrary to process reliabi-
lism, virtue reliabilism is not in a good position to account for collaborative knowl-
edge, because of its strong demands on cognitive agency. In their words:
[Virtue reliabilism requires] what we might refer to as responsible cognitive 
agency, where responsible cognitive agency requires cognitive agency, plus 
responsibility. There is no clear sense in which a TMS, for example, might be 
assigned responsibility for its cognitive success and failures, and it is in this 
sense we have suggested that extended and distributed memory systems do not 
qualify as cognitive agents: they may be cognitive agents simpliciter, but they 
are not responsible cognitive agents (idid., 242).
Thus, Michaelian and Arango-Muñoz distinguish between two notions of cogni-
tive agency, one of which is richer, because it also involves responsibility. In this 
richer sense, they claim, “distributed memory systems do not qualify as cognitive 
agents.” While this may initially sound unproblematic, it leads to a rather negative 
consequence of their view. If a group does not qualify as a cognitive agent, then 
it cannot qualify as an epistemic group agent either. Especially when the missing 
property—i.e., epistemic responsibility—is one of the two components of positive 
epistemic standing.
Contrary to the above, the present approach demonstrates that epistemic collabo-
rations can qualify as both reliable and epistemically responsible cognitive agents. 
This is possible on the present view, because of the way it captures the ability intui-
tion on knowledge, which Michaelian and Arango-Muñoz abandon. According to 
virtue reliabilism, a process counts as a cognitive ability, capable of generating epis-
temically responsible beliefs, if and only if it is cognitively integrated by coopera-
tively interacting with other aspects of the cognitive system. In the case of epistemic 
collaborations, group members continuously interact with each other in order to 
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generate an integrated distributed belief-forming process. The continuous interac-
tions between the members of the group allow them to continuously monitor each 
other’s performance. In result, if there is something wrong with their distributed 
process, the group will be alerted to it and respond appropriately. When no alert 
signals are communicated, the group can responsibly accept the deliverances of its 
distributed cognitive ability by default. This sense of epistemic responsibility arises 
out of the members’ collaborative interactions and belongs to the group as a whole.
Therefore, in contrast to distributed process reliabilism, the present approach—
distributed virtue reliabilism—has the resources to understand groups as epistemi-
cally responsible cognitive agents, and thus as epistemic group agents with full posi-
tive epistemic standing (i.e., as agents that can be both reliable and epistemically 
responsible). Furthermore, it does so by focusing on the group members’ reciprocal 
interactions, which is epistemic collaborations’ distinctive feature.
Being in a position to account for epistemic responsibility in the case of collabo-
rative knowledge provides distributed virtue reliabilism with three advantages. First, 
it preserves the ability intuition on knowledge, even in the case of epistemic col-
laborations. While process reliabilists may wish to undermine its theoretical import, 
in Sect. 3.2, it was noted that the ability intuition on knowledge is well motivated, 
precisely because it can help address several problems with process reliabilism.
Secondly, focusing on epistemic responsibility can help clarify the sense in 
which epistemic collaborations can motivate strong epistemic anti-individualism 
in a distinctive way. The present approach does not claim that collaborative knowl-
edge is irreducibly social, because the relevant proposition is collectively believed 
(or ‘accepted’). As noted in the introductory section, this is an alternative approach 
to group knowledge (see Gilbert (2007a, b, 2010), Rolin (2008), Tuomela (2004)) 
that is not necessary to the present approach. Independently of whether the relevant 
proposition may count, in some appropriate sense, as collectively believed, it can 
still qualify as irreducibly collective knowledge. According to distributed virtue reli-
abilism, the resulting knowledge is irreducibly social, because the positive epistemic 
standing of the relevant belief consists in its being the product of a responsible and 
reliable process that is irreducibly social.25
Finally, accounting for epistemic responsibility consolidates the claim that epis-
temic collaborations qualify as epistemic group agents, which is crucial for avoiding 
the idea of knowledge without a knowing subject. This is a theoretical move that has 
been recently advocated by Giere with respect to knowledge generated by scientific 
research teams. Even though Giere accentuates the distributed nature of the scien-
tific process that produces knowledge, he denies the existence of a distributed agent 
that knows. Giere suggests that, in such cases, we should opt for an “epistemology 
25 Of course, group knowledge, just as any other type of knowledge, involves belief in the proposition 
known, and the relevant belief must, on some appropriate construal, qualify as the belief of the group—if 
only in an instrumentalist sense. Nevertheless, whether the relevant belief (or acceptance) counts as the 
belief of the group, because it is of the summative or non-summative type, the belief of some opera-
tive members of the group or merely the belief of a single representative (for an overview, see Tollefsen 
2004) is an issue we do not here need to take a stance on. On the present account, any of these possibili-
ties with respect to group belief may give rise to collaborative group knowledge.
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without a knowing subject” [(Giere 2007), quoting (Popper 1968)], according to 
which, we may only claim that “it has been scientifically established that p” (Giere 
2002b) or that ‘it is scientifically known that p.’
Initially, this might sound like a viable option. The problem, however, is that it 
significantly departs from mainstream epistemology, which has always assumed 
that knowledge is knowledge of a subject S. The present account can help us resist 
Giere’s (and Popper’s) impersonal image of collaborative knowledge. While distrib-
uted virtue reliabilism denies that collaboratively produced knowledge belongs to 
any particular individual subject, S, it insists that it still is knowledge of a subject, 
G—the epistemic group agent, whose positive epistemic standing results from its 
members’ continuous and reciprocal interactions.26
5  Conclusion
The paper introduced the hybrid approach of distributed virtue reliabilism, in 
order to account for the special case of group knowledge that is produced on the 
basis of epistemic collaborations. Collaborative knowledge is resistant to aggre-
gative analyses of group knowledge, because of the defining feature of epistemic 
collaborations—i.e., the mutual interactions of their members. The present account 
focused on this special feature of epistemic collaborations in order to explain how 
the resulting true beliefs can entertain positive epistemic standing. It was argued that 
the continuous reciprocal interactions between the members of epistemic collabora-
tions contribute both to the reliability and epistemic responsibility of the resulting 
26 This section compared distributed virtue reliabilism to distributed process reliabilism. To my knowl-
edge, this is the only alternative account of knowledge produced by epistemic collaborations that com-
bines distributed cognition with a mainstream approach to knowledge (i.e., process reliabilism). Bird 
(2010, 2014) has also argued that scientific knowledge is a form of group knowledge, by appealing to the 
notion of distributed cognition. I do not, however, consider Bird’s account to be an alternative to the pre-
sent approach for the following two reasons. First, Bird is interested in developing an account of ‘social 
knowing’ as it applies to ‘wider science’, where the epistemic subject is not a well-defined group of col-
laborating individuals. Rather on Bird’s view, the epistemic subject is the whole scientific (international) 
community, which might partly comprise of individuals that are not involved in the production of knowl-
edge (some of them may simply be consumers of it, for example). Secondly, Bird does not cash out his 
view in terms of any of the existing mainstream accounts of knowledge. Therefore, both Bird’s explana-
tory target and his approach are significantly different to the present ones. A further difference concerns 
our understanding of distributed cognition and thus what may count as part of a distributed cognitive sys-
tem. Bird interprets the idea of distributed cognition by invoking Durkheim’s notion of organic solidarity. 
Following this line, Bird concludes that, in the case of scientific knowledge, the epistemic group agent 
can consist of individuals that only indirectly (i.e., non-epistemically) contribute to or benefit from a 
scientific claim. On the contrary, the present approach understands distributed cognition in terms of DST. 
According to DST, in order for something (be it an artefact or an individual) to count as a constitutive 
part of the epistemic group agent, it must continuously and mutually interact with the group in the way 
the group produces knowledge. While I am sympathetic to Bird’s account and his idea of ‘social know-
ing’ as it might apply to ‘wider science’, I worry that his underlying understanding of distributed cogni-
tion is vulnerable to the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy and the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry as these are widely 
discussed in the literature on extended and distributed cognition. On the contrary, the present approach 
can satisfactorily deal with these worries due to its reliance on the notion of a coupled system from DST 
(for more details on these issues, see (Palermos 2016a)).
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beliefs. This collaboratively generated positive epistemic standing is unique to epis-
temic collaborations and amounts to a collective property that belongs to the corre-
sponding group as a whole. Thus, on distributed virtue reliabilism, knowledge pro-
duced by epistemic collaborations qualifies as a special—albeit widespread—kind 
of group knowledge that lends support to strong epistemic anti-individualism in a 
distinctive way.
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